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THE UNRUH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: IS A PRIVATE
CLUB A BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT AFTER
O'CONNOR v. VILLAGE GREEN OWNERS
ASS'N?
In O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n the California Su-
preme Court held the Unruh Civil Rights Act, which prohibits dis-
crimination by "all business establishments of every kind whatso-
ever," prevents the exclusion of children from a condominium
complex. The court's finding that a condominium owners associa-
tion falls within the Unruh Act's reference to "business establish-
ments" expands the Act's already broad reach. This Comment
contends that most private clubs are also "business establish-
ments" under the Unruh Act, making discrimination by them vio-
lative of the Act.
INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court's recent decision in O'Connor v.
Village Green Owners Ass'n1 has expanded the already broad area
covered by the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Unruh Act or the Act).'
The Unruh Act, which prohibits discrimination by "all business es-
tablishments of every kind whatsoever," was construed by the
O'Connor court to prevent the exclusion of families with children in
a condominium complex. The court held that the condominium own-
ers association is a "business establishment" within the meaning of
the Act, and therefore is prohibited from discriminating against fam-
ilies with children.' In so holding, the California Supreme Court has
stretched the meaning of the term "business establishment" beyond
any previous judicial interpretation of the Unruh Act.
The Unruh Act provides in relevant part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no
matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are
entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privi-
leges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.4
1. 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (May 1983).
2. Ch. 1866, 1959 Cal. Stat. 4424 (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 51
(West 1982)).
3. 33 Cal. 3d at 796, 662 P.2d at 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
4. CAL. Civ. CODE § 51 (West 1982).
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Unruh Act litigation has centered on two areas: the types of pro-
hibited discrimination, and the scope of "business establishment.
' 5
Both these areas have been broadly interpreted, giving the Act far-
reaching effect. This Comment will focus only on the "business es-
tablishment" aspect of the Unruh Act, first explaining how the
O'Connor decision served to broaden the term. This Comment will
discuss whether, after O'Connor, a private club is a "business estab-
lishment" under the Unruh Act. Bringing private clubs within the
reach of the Unruh Act would prohibit all arbitrary discrimination
by these clubs in the admitting of applicants and the servicing of
guests.0
O'Connor v Village Green Owners Ass'n7 AND THE BROAD
INTERPRETATION OF "BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENT"
In O'Connor, the court held a condominium owners association
had sufficient businesslike attributes to fall within the scope of the
Unruh Act's reference to "business establishment." 8 The Village
Green Owners Association was therefore forbidden by the Act from
arbitrarily excluding children from the complex.
The Village Green complex was converted into a condominium de-
velopment in 1973. As part of the conversion, the developers drafted
and recorded a declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictioris
(CC&Rs) to run with the property.9 One such provision prohibited
residency by anyone under the age of eighteen. 10
5. Mohr & Weber, The Unruh Civil Rights Act: Just How Far Does it Reach?,
11 BEy. HILLs B.A.J. 32, 33 (1977).
6. Although the Unruh Act prohibits a "business establishment" from engaging
in any form of arbitrary discrimination, it does not absolutely preclude such an establish-
ment from excluding a customer in all circumstances. The California Supreme Court has
stated that an entrepreneur need not tolerate persons who disrupt his business. "A busi-
ness establishment may, of course, promulgate reasonable deportment regulations that
are rationally related to the services performed and the facilities provided." In re Cox, 3
Cal. 3d 205, 217, 474 P.2d 992, 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 31 (1970).
7. 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983).
8. Id. at 796, 662 P.2d at 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 324. The court noted that the
association, through a board of directors, is charged with employing a professional prop-
erty management firm, obtaining insurance for the benefit of all owners, and maintaining
and repairing common areas and facilities of the project. It is also charged with estab-
lishing and collecting assessments from all owners and with adopting and enforcing rules
and regulations for the common good. In summary, it found the association to perform
all the customary business functions which, in a traditional landlord-tenant relationship,
rest on the shoulders of the landlord. It also noted that a common theme running through
the description of the association's powers and duties is an overall function to protect and
enhance the project's economic value. Id. at 796, 662 P.2d at 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
9. Id. at 793, 662 P.2d at 428, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
10. The court was cognizant of the fact the developer who established the CC&Rs
operated a "business establishment" and would be subject to the Unruh Act. The court
said it still needs to determine whether the association is itself a "business establishment"
under the Act, as it could simply cancel the age restriction enacted by the developer and
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The O'Connors, after giving birth to a son, were given written no-
tice that his presence constituted a violation of the CC&Rs. After
several unsuccessful attempts to find other suitable housing, the
O'Connors sued the association, seeking to have the age restriction
declared invalid. An action was also brought by the association to
enjoin the O'Connor's from residing in the complex with their
child.11
The court first noted that because it had previously held that a
blanket exclusion of children from residency is the type of arbitrary
discrimination prohibited by the Unruh Act,12 the only question to
be decided was whether the condominium association was a "busi-
ness establishment" within the scope of the Act.13 The majority rea-
soned that it was, relying heavily on their interpretation of "business
establishment" in Burks v. Poppy Construction Co. 4 Burks, the first
case decided under the Unruh Act, involved discrimination by a con-
struction company engaged in the business of building and selling
tract housing. The Burks court held the company was a "business
establishment" under the Unruh Act and, in interpreting the phrase
adopt such a restriction on its own. Id. at 795 n. 4, 662 P.2d at 430 n. 4, 191 Cal. Rptr.
at 323, n. 4.
11. Id. at 793, 662 P.2d at 428-29, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 321-22.
12. The California Supreme Court had held the Unruh Act prohibits an owner of
an apartment complex from refusing to rent any of the apartments to a family, solely
because the family had a minor child. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721,
736-40, 640 P.2d 115, 124-27, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 506-8, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 129
(1982).
In Marina Point the main issue was whether the Unruh Act, which expressly refers to
discrimination based on "sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin," encom-
passed discrimination against children. In finding the Act does prohibit such discrimina-
tion, the court relied on their declaration in an earlier decision, that the identification of
particular bases of discrimination in the Act is illustrative rather than restrictive, and the
Act bars all arbitrary discrimination. See In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 216, 474 P.2d 992,
999, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 31 (1970). The Marina Point court added that the Unruh Act
also prohibits a "business establishment" from excluding an entire class of individuals
based on a prediction that the class "as a whole" is more likely to commit misconduct
than some other class of the public. 30 Cal. 3d at 739, 640 P.2d at 126, 180 Cal. Rptr. at
507.
13. 33 Cal. 3d at 794, 662 P.2d at 429, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 323. In Marina Point
Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 129 (1982), the court pointed out that for nearly two decades the Unruh Act has
been held to apply to the business of renting housing accommodations, and therefore had
no difficulty in finding the Marina Point, Ltd. apartment complex to be a "business es-
tablishment" under the Act. Id. at 731, 640 P.2d at 121, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 502. The
O'Connor court was left to decide if a condominium association is also a "business estab-
lishment" under the Unruh Act, and therefore, like a landlord of an apartment complex,
prohibited from maintaining an exclusionary policy against children.
14. 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962).
"all business establishments of every kind whatsoever," the Califor-
nia Supreme Court pronounced a broad definition. The court said:
The Legislature used the words "all" and "of every kind whatsoever" in
referring to business establishments covered by the Unruh Act (Civ. Code,
§ 51), and the inclusion of these words, without any exception and without
specification of particular kinds of enterprises, leaves no doubt that the term
"business establishment" was used in the broadest sense reasonably
possible.1 5
In subsequent cases the term "business establishment" has been
held to include a physician,"' a real estate broker,1 7 a buyer and
seller of tract houses,18 a landlord of a triplex apartment building,19
and now, in O'Connor, a condominium association.
In creating such a broad standard for "business establishments,"
the Burks court analyzed the legislative history of the Unruh Act.
The court focused on the original version of the bill as presented to
the legislature. In addition to affording protection from discrimina-
tion in "business establishments" (which at that time was not pre-
ceded by the word "all" or followed by the phrase "of every kind
whatsoever"), the bill referred specifically to other rights and enti-
ties, including the right "to purchase real property. ' 20 Thus, al-
though the Unruh Act as finally enacted in 1959 eliminated such
specific references, the court in Burks found the construction com-
pany which built and sold housing accommodations came under the
Act.2'
The court explained that their decision was consistent with the
legislature's intent in omitting the specific references. The court in
Burks stated "[t]hese deletions can be explained on the ground that
the Legislature deemed specific references mere surplusage, unneces-
sary in view of the broad language of the act as finally passed.12 2
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed this declaration of legis-
lative intent twenty-one years later in O'Connor. In O'Connor, the
court reasoned that because "associations" were also one of the spe-
cific references in the original version of the bill, a condominium
owners association falls under the purview of the Unruh Act.23 The
court declared "[t]he broadened scope of business establishments in
the final version of the bill . . . is indicative of an intent by the Leg-
15. Id. at 468, 370 P.2d at 315-16, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 611-12.
16. Washington v. Blampin, 226 Cal. App. 2d 604, 38 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1964).
17. Lee v. O'Hara, 57 Cal. 2d 476, 370 P.2d 321, 20 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1962).
18. Don Wilson Builders v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. App. 2d 77, 33 Cal. Rptr.
621 (1963).
19. Swann v. Burkett, 209 Cal. App. 2d 685, 26 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1962).




23. 33 Cal. 3d at 795-96, 662 P.2d at 430, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
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islature to include therein all formerly specified private and public
groups or organizations that may reasonably be found to constitute
'business establishments of every type whatsoever.' "214 The majority
opinion concluded that, consistent with the legislature's intent to use
the term "business establishment" in the broadest sense reasonably
possible, the Village Green Owners Association is a "business estab-
lishment" within the meaning of the Unruh Act. 5
This holding expands the interpretation of a "business establish-
ment" to its farthest point to date. Justice Mosk strongly stated in
his dissenting opinion, "the transformation of such loosely knit pro-
tective association into a 'business' is stretching the concept of en-
trepreneurial venture beyond all reason. '2 6
PRIVATE CLUB27 DISCRIMINATION AS A
VIOLATION OF THE UNRUH ACT
The definition of "business .establishment" declared by the
O'Connor court, is broad enough to include most private clubs. 28
Clubs that are "truly private" have been allowed to discriminate in
membership and guest policies in any manner they so choose.29
24. Id.
25. Id. at 796, 662 P.2d at 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
26. Id. at 802, 662 P.2d at 435, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 328 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
27. Private clubs refer to those groups or organizations whose memberships and
guest policies are selective. This Comment will focus on the large, prestigious "country
club" type of private club, because this is where discriminatory practices are most harm-
ful to those excluded. See infra text accompanying notes 60, 61.
Other types of private clubs may also be "business establishments" under the Unruh
Act, to the extent they display sufficient businesslike attributes. The factors addressed in
this Comment pertaining to the "country club" type of private club are in no way ex-
haustive in making a determination on any other type of private club.
28. The California Supreme Court has discussed a private club as a business estab-
lishment within the meaning of a Los Angeles city ordinance. The court said that a bona
fide social organization was not a business within the meaning of the ordinance, which
required the payment of a license fee by persons engaged in the business of retail liquor
dealers. Cuzner v. The California Club, 155 Cal. 303, 100 P. 868 (1909). The court in
Cuzner used a much narrower definition of business than has ever been used under the
Unruh Act. It should be emphasized that this Comment does not contend that a private
club is a business establishment under any definition, or within the purview of any stat-
ute; only that it is a "business establishment of every kind whatsoever" under the Unruh
Act.
29. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment applies to private
conduct only if it is sufficiently intermingled with the state, so as to allow a finding of
state action. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). In the leading case on the application of the equal protection
clause to private clubs, the United States Supreme Court held that the state must have
"significantly involved itself with the invidious discrimination" in order for the club's
conduct to fall under the fourteenth amendment. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
Bringing private clubs within the Unruh Act would prohibit such
discrimination."0
163, 173 (1972) (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967)). See generally
Goodwin, Challenging the Private Club: Sex Discrimination Plaintiffs Barred at the
Door, 13 Sw. L. REV. 237 (1982) (an analysis of possible constitutional and statutory
challenges to sex discrimination in private clubs; also an in depth discussion on what
constitutes state involvement).
Discrimination by clubs claiming to be private has also frequently been challenged
under Title 11 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e.g., Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A. of Ra-
leigh, N.C., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D.
Tex. 1970). Although the Civil Rights Act has constituted a sweeping prohibition of
discrimination at places of public accommodations, it excluded private clubs from its
reach. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969). The exemption for private clubs in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e)(1976)) leaves a club free to dis-
criminate if it can stand up to an inquiry of whether it is "truly private."
For a discussion of private clubs and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see Note, Civil
Rights Act of 1964-Public Accommodations-Private Club Exemption, 45 N.C.L. REV.
498 (1967); Note, The Private Club Exemption to the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A
Study in Judicial Confusion, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1112 (1969).
30. The question of whether discrimination by private clubs is in violation of the
Unruh Act has not yet been determined by the California Supreme Court, but has
arisen.
In 1974 some of the commissioners of the Coastal Zone Conservation Commission
were invited to the Ingomar Club, a private club. A female commissioner who requested
to join the tour was denied entry because women were generally disallowed on the prem-
ises. The Attorney General, after being notified of the incident, brought suit against the
Ingomar Club, alleging violation of the Unruh Act. It was contended in the complaint
that the club had become a "quasi-business establishment" by use of its facilities for
business, civic, and political functions. People v. Ingomar Club, No. 56006 (Humboldt
County, Cal. Super. Ct. 1974). The case was resolved pursuant to an Order in accor-
dance with stipulation and agreement filed Feb. 28, 1978. Dismissal filed May 25, 1978.
Letter from Donald R. Michael, County Clerk, June 22, 1983 (discussing pre-trial settle-
ment of the case). See also Murphy, Men-Only Club Policy Challenged, L.A. Times,
July 2, 1974, pt. IV, at 1, col. 2. More recently, several girls who were rejected for
membership in a boys' club solely on the basis of their sex, brought suit against the club.
In Ibister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, 144 Cal. App. 3d 338, 192 Cal. Rptr. 560
(1983), review granted, No. S.F. 24623 (California Supreme Court August 25, 1983),
the court of appeal determined this club was not a "business establishment" under the
Unruh Act. In reversing the lower court's finding that this denial of membership was in
violation of the Unruh Act, the court of appeal stated the club was merely a nonprofit
agency which offers programs and facilities for a nominal fee to its members, and does
not have a "businesslike purpose." Id. at 346, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 565. The court concluded
the Unruh Act "does not apply generally to noncommercial entities (such as charitable,
volunteer and community service agencies, fraternal societies, clubs and organizations
that serve particular religious, ethnic or cultural groups)." Id. at 348, 192 Cal. Rptr. at
567. On August 25, 1983, the California Supreme Court granted review of the case. No.
S.F. 24623.
In a similar case a California court of appeal stated the expulsion of a homosexual
from the Boy Scouts violated both his common law right of fair procedure and the Unruh
Act. The court in Curran v. Mt. Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, No. 2
Civ. 66755 (lst Appellate Dist., California 1983), noted the Unruh Act's history of for-
bidding discrimination in public accommodations and said the legislature passed the Un-
ruh Act with broad language in an effort to guard against restrictive interpretations. The
court ruled the Act's reference to "all business establishments of every kind whatsoever"
was meant to apply to noncommercial as well as commercial establishments. The court
said because the Boy Scouts have substantial "business attributes" the organization falls
within the scope of the Act.
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The strongest and possibly the controlling argument in determin-
ing a private club to be a "business establishment" is found in exam-
ining the language of the original version of the assembly bill."1 The
bill read in relevant part:
All citizens within the jurisdiction of this state . . . are entitled to the full
and equal admittance, accommodations, advantages, facilities, membership,
and privileges in, or accorded by, all public or private groups, organiza-
tions, associations, business establishments, schools, and public facilities; to
purchase real property; and to obtain the services of any professional per-
son, group or association.
3 2
As the bill demonstrates, the legislature specifically referred to ad-
mittance and membership in all private groups. The California Su-
preme Court stated in Burks,33 and again in O'Connor,4 that the
deletion of the specific references in the bill as enacted indicates the
legislature deemed them no longer necessary in light of the broad
language of the Act as finally passed. The O'Connor court expressly
declared legislative intent was to include "all formerly specified pri-
vate and public groups or organizations that may reasonably be
found to constitute 'business establishments of every type
whatsoever.' ,,-1
This expression of legislative intent mandates that if an entity was
one of the specific references in the original version of the bill, it
must be included under the Unruh Act if it can reasonably be found
to constitute a "business establishment of every kind whatsoever."
The O'Connor decision has added to this declaration of legislative
31. Cal. A.B. 594, 1959 Reg. Sess.
32. Id. (emphasis added). See also Horowitz, The 1959 California Equal Rights
in "Business Establishments" Statute: A Problem in Statutory Application, 33 S. CAL.
L. REv. 260 (1960). The article contains a comprehensive examination of the proposed
drafts of the bill before its final adoption. The article was written just after the enact-
ment of the Unruh Act, and before the courts had interpreted it. The author, in speculat-
ing on how the act would be applied, thought membership clubs did not fall within its
scope, because the relationship between discriminator and discriminatee is essentially
continuous, personal, and social. The California Supreme Court, in determining whether
an entity is a "business establishment" under the Unruh Act, has not relied on these
characteristics.
Additionally, the author mentions that legislative history might buttress his conclusion
in that specific references to private groups and organizations in the first draft of the bill
were eliminated in later drafts. The California Supreme Court has declared that the
specific references were no longer necessary in light of the broad language of "all busi-
ness establishments of every kind whatsoever" adopted in the statute as enacted. Burks v.
Poppy Constr. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 469, 370 P.2d 313, 316, 20 Cal. Rptr. 609, 612
(1962).
33. 57 Cal. 2d at 469, 370 P.2d at 316, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 612.
34. 33 Cal. 3d at 795, 662 P.2d at 430, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
35. Id. at 795-96, 662 P.2d at 430, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
intent, in holding that a condominium owners association is such a
"business establishment." Many private clubs have more businesslike
attributes than a condominium owners association. Often these clubs
contain restaurants, bars, golf courses, and lodgings. Operation of
such facilities brings a private club within the Unruh Act's reference
to "business establishments."
Even before O'Connor, legal scholars examined the business at-
tributes of private clubs, and questioned how these attributes could
make discriminatory policies by such clubs vulnerable to attack. One
writer submits that any private club that leases its facilities to
outside organizations, and allows members to bring in guests, would
have sufficient business attributes to be subject to the Unruh Act.36
Another writer considered various business activities undertaken
by private clubs, such as the investment of the dues of its members,
and the operation of a tennis or golf "pro shop."3a7 The author ques-
tioned if such activities can make a club a "business establishment"
under the Unruh Act. After O'Connor, it appears that this question
can be answered affirmatively.
Holding private clubs amenable to the Unruh Act is also consis-
tent with decisions in other jurisdictions that hold such clubs to be
within their state public accommodation statutes. The Unruh Act
replaced prior sections 51-54 of the California Civil Code, which
covered places of public accommodation or amusement. 38 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court said the legislature enacted the Unruh Act
with "business establishments" replacing "public accommodations"
because of the legislature's concern that the courts of appeal were
improperly curtailing the scope of public accommodations.39 Because
the Unruh Act's reach has been expanded beyond public accommo-
dations, a finding that a club is within a state's public accommoda-
tion statute would bring such a club well within the reach of the
Unruh Act. °
36. O'Brien, May Private Clubs Lawfully Discriminate? 51 L.A.B.J. 9 (1975).
37. Mohr & Weber, supra, note 5.
38. Prior CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 51-52 were amended, and §§ 53-54 were repealed by
the Unruh Act. Unruh Civil Rights Act, ch. 1866, 1959 Cal. Stat. 4424.
39. In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 214, 474 P.2d 992, 997, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 29 (1970).
Section 51 was amended to cover the broader area of all business establishments in re-
sponse to a series of court of appeal decisions, where a cemetery, a gymnasium, and a
private school were held not to be places of public accommodation. See, e.g., Gardner v.
Vic Tanny Compton, Inc., 182 Cal. App. 2d 506, 6 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1960) (gymnasium);
Reed v. Hollywood Professional School, 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887, 338 P.2d 633
(1959) (private school); Long v. Mountain View Cemetery Association, 130 Cal. App. 2d
328, 278 P.2d 945 (1955) (cemetery).
40. The court in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180
Cal. Rptr. 496, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 129 (1982), stated that the Unruh Act,
"[elmanating from and modeled upon traditional 'public accommodations' legislation,"
has expanded the reach of such statutes from common carriers and places of public ac-
commodation to include "all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." Id. at
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One such case involved the refusal of a Pennsylvania chapter of
the Moose Lodge organization to extend service to a black guest.
The United States Supreme Court designated the club as private,
and found there was insufficient state involvement to make the club's
discriminatory policies within the purview of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.41 In a separate case, stemming
from this same incident, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
this same so-called private club had brought itself within the ambit
of a "public accommodation" with respect to its dining room and
bar.12 The club did this by opening them to guests, subject only to
the limitation they be invited and be of the Caucasian race.43 The
court found the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act44 prohibited the
club from denying service within those facilities to any person be-
cause of his race.4
5
Similarly, in a Minnesota case,46 that state's supreme court held
the Jaycees Club's discriminatory conduct against women to be a
violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.' 7 In reaching this
conclusion, the court said the intent of the legislature was to broaden
the term "place of public accommodation" to include a business fa-
cility of any kind whose goods and privileges are sold or otherwise
made available to the public .' The court used a three-step analysis
in finding the Jaycees to be a public business facility.
731, 640 P.2d at 120, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 502. See also Swann v. Burkett, 209 Cal. App.
2d 685, 26 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1962). The court in discussing the phrase "all business estab-
lishments of every kind whatsoever" found it to cover a much broader field than "places
of public accommodations." It concluded that the Unruh Act's reference to "business
establishments" would "include the places of amusement and of public acc6mmodation
theretofore mentioned, as they undoubtedly are business establishments." Id. at 690, 26
Cal. Rptr. at 289. This language implies the Unruh Act includes places of public accom-
modation and beyond. A finding by a court in another state, that a private club is within
the reach of their particular public accommodation statute, is a strong argument that the
club is also within the reach of the broader Unruh Act. See supra notes 42-45 and ac-
companying text.
41. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972). See supra note 29
for further discussion of this case.
42. Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n v. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge
No. 107, 448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594 (1972).
43. Id. at 458, 294 A.2d at 597.
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951, 952, 954, 955 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1982).
45. 448 Pa. at 458, 294 A.2d at 597. The court was only deciding on the servicing
of guests and said that fraternal organizations are immune form the Human Relations
Act when related to membership and when that accommodation is distinctly private as to
the members of that organization. Id. at 459, 294 A.2d at 598.
46. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981).
47. MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3) (1980).
48. 305 N.W.2d at 766.
Most importantly, the court found the club offered a product by
selling memberships in an organization whose aim is the advance-
ment of its members.49 The court concluded that by virtue of its sale
of individual memberships, the organization was a business.
The court also found the club to be public for purposes of the
statute because, although it is selective in granting privileges and
benefits, it is unselective in choosing to whom it sells memberships.5 °
In dictum the court noted that private associations which are selec-
tive in membership are not public and do not fall under the Minne-
sota statute.51 This is unpersuasive for decisions under the Unruh
Act, as its scope is not limited to public accommodations. The Unruh
Act, emanating from traditional public accommodation legislation,
expanded the reach of the statute from common carriers and "places
of public accommodation" to include "business establishments of
every kind whatsoever. 52
These and other similar decisions53 display how other states, in an
effort to prohibit discrimination, have found "private clubs" to be
public accommodations. The Unruh Act allows California courts to
reach even further to prevent discrimination by clubs that, if not
found to be a place of public accommodation, can be found to rea-
sonably constitute a "business establishment of every kind
whatsoever."
The Minnesota court, by emphasizing that a club can be called a
business because it sells memberships, reveals another important fac-
tor in finding that a private club falls under the Unruh Act. In the
case involving the Jaycees, 4 the court stated the club actively re-
cruited their members and treated them as customers.55 However,
selling memberships does not have to be limited to this situation.
Whenever a member pays an initial fee and membership dues for the
privilege of joining a private club, there is a selling of that member-
ship. The club is offering, for a price, goods and services such as the
use of the facilities or an opportunity to make business contacts. This
49. Id. at 769.
50. The club allowed women to join, but they were only allowed to be associate
members, who are afforded fewer privileges. Id. at 771.
51. Id.
52. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 731, 640 P.2d 115, 120, 180
Cal. Rptr. 496, 502, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 129 (1982).
53. See Wenkart, Private Club Discrimination: The Civil Rights Statutes and the
Constitution, 7 SAN FERN. V.L. REv. 77 (1978). But see United States Jaycees v.
Bloomfield, 434 A.2d 1379 (D.C. 1981) (the court of appeal found the Jaycees not to be
a place of public accommodation under the D.C. statute. This statute, in defining public
accommodations, lists more than sixty places, and a voluntary membership organization
was not one of them); ld. at 1381 (construing D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 6-2202(x), 6-
2241(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978-1979)).
54. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981).
55. Id. at 769.
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business transaction provides another factor in enabling a club to be
deemed a "business establishment."
If California courts are willing to adopt the theory that a private
club engages in business by selling memberships, such a club would
seem to satisfy even the much narrower definition of "business estab-
lishments" adhered to by the dissenting justices in the O'Connor
opinion. In O'Connor, Justice Mosk, dissenting to a condominium
owners association being called a "business establishment," quoted
an earlier California Supreme Court decision in stating, "there is no
indication that the Legislature intended to broaden the scope of sec-
tion 51 to include discrimination other than those made by a 'busi-
ness establishment' in the course of furnishing goods, services or fa-
cilities to its clients, patrons or customers."'56 Certainly, a club that
sells an individual a membership giving him access to the club's res-
taurant, bar, or golf course is furnishing facilities, goods, and ser-
vices to its client members.
Justice Mosk also stated that organizations like homeowners as-
sociations, which are in no way commercial or profit-seeking, are not
"business establishments. ' 57 A private club that partakes in a series
of business transactions through membership sales, and operates a
bar or restaurant, even if not profit-seeking, would be commercial in
nature, and thus satisfy Justice Mosk's definition of a "business
establishment."
The fact a private club is not seeking a profit in these transactions
is no bar to finding it a "business establishment" under the Unruh
Act. In O'Connor, the court easily disposed of the potential problem
of the nonprofit status of the condominium association. "[W]e see no
reason to insist that profit-seeking be a sine qua non for coverage
under the act. Nothing in the language or history of its enactment
calls for excluding an organization from its scope simply because it
is nonprofit."5 8
56. O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 802, 662 P.2d 427,
435, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 328 (1983) (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Alcorn v. Anbro
Engineering, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 500, 468 P.2d 216, 220, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 92 (1970))
(emphasis in original).
57. Id. at 802, 662 P.2d at 435, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
58. Id. at 796, 662 P.2d at 430-31, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 323-24. The court used hos-
pitals as an example of an entity that, while often nonprofit, is clearly a business estab-
lishment to the extent they "employ a vast array of persons, care for an extensive physi-
cal plant, and charge substantial fees to those who use the facilities." Id. at 796, 662
P.2d at 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 324. These business attributes are also found in the types
of private clubs this Comment contends fall under the Unruh Act's reference to "busi-
ness establishments."
Establishing that private clubs can be included under the Unruh
Act still does not bring every such club in California within the
grasp of the Act's long reach. Certainly some clubs have few or no
business attributes, and are no more than a small group of close
friends who have come together for social reasons. These are also the
clubs where an, excluded person would have the least need or justifi-
cation to become a member.59
The Unruh Act would prohibit exclusion from the large, prestigi-
ous clubs that have traditionally been a source of power and wealth
in this country.60 Many of these clubs are business oriented and are
joined by individuals in an attempt to establish business contacts.
While these clubs are not an official place of business transactions,
members are professionals whose association with other professionals
naturally results in business exchanges. Additionally, clubs whose
membership fees qualify as business deductions for the individual
serve career-related interests. Persons who are excluded contend they
are denied business opportunities and enhanced professional status.61
The California courts have already taken the lead in compelling
admission of individuals arbitrarily denied membership to formal
trade and professional organizations.62 While courts in other juris-
59. In small clubs of close friends, a right to associate with those of one's own
choosing would seemingly outweigh the right of any excluded person to be allowed ad-
mittance. The freedom of association and a right to privacy are common defenses used
by private clubs when faced with allegations of discrimination.
While the freedom of association is not expressly guaranteed by the Constitution, the
United States Supreme Court first recognized it as a constitutional right in NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Similarly, a constitutional right of privacy was recognized by the United States Su-
preme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Freedom of association and the right of privacy in the private club context has been
dealt with by many commentators. The consensus is the right is limited by its very na-
ture to the most personal, social relationships and may be restricted by countervailing
interests. See Wenkart, Private Club Discrimination" The Civil Rights Statutes and the
Constitution, 7 SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 77 (1978); Note, Sex Discrimination in Private
Clubs, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 417 (1977); Comment, Association, Privacy and the Private
Club: The Constitutional Conflict, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 460 (1970).
In California the right to privacy became, after a 1972 amendment, an inalienable
right preserved in article I, section I, of the California Constitution. The California Su-
preme Court in its first opportunity to interpret the privacy amendment, quoted from the
state election brochure which said the right of privacy should be abridged only when
there is a "compelling public need." White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222,
234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106 (1975).
Again, the right is not absolute. Surely a "compelling public need" can be found in
preventing arbitrary discrimination against California citizens by private clubs.
60. Goodwin, supra note 29, at 280-84. (discussion of the professional interest
issue).
61. Id.
62. Although this Comment will not discuss formal trade and professional organi-
zations such as medical or dental associations in any detail, tourts generally will not
interfere with admission to such organizations, no matter how arbitrarily a candidate has
been rejected. However, based on common law principles and public policy considera-
tions, judicial review may occur where membership is essential to the right to earn a
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dictions have required a strict showing of "economic necessity," the
California Supreme Court has not limited itself to this requirement
in granting judicial review. The court has stated that a person who
shows that exclusion from membership in an association deprives
him of substantial economic benefits has a right to judicial interven-
tion with respect to the denial of his application for membership.'"
It is but a slight extension of this rationale to argue that admission
to certain business-oriented clubs, also important to one's profession,
should also be non-discriminatory. 4 While a court may not be able
to prevent discrimination by private clubs under the same common
law principles it applies to formal trade and professional organiza-
tions, 5 it does not have to. The Unruh Act provides the perfect vehi-
cle. Recognizing that these business-oriented clubs, in addition to
their overall business purpose, partake in business transactions
through membership sales, and operation of restaurants, bars, and
golf courses, are "business establishments" under the Unruh Act,
would force them to be non-discriminatory.
living. See, e.g., Pinsker v. Pac. Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 541, 526 P.2d
253, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1974); Pinsker v. Pac. Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d
160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721,
155 P.2d 329 (1944); Kronen v. Pac. Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 237 Cal. App. 2d
289, 46 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1965) cert. denied, 384 U.S. 905 (1966).
63. Pinsker v. Pac. Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, I Cal. 3d 160, 165, 460 P.2d 495,
498, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623, 626 (1961) (Pinsker 1). After the case was remanded and then
again heard by the supreme court on appeal, the court stated its conclusion in Pinsker I,
that "economic necessity" is not an indispensable prerequisite to judicial review, is the
latest development of the proper role of the courts with respect to membership decisions
reached by private associations. Pinsker v. Pac. Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d
541, 552, 526 P.2d 253, 261, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 253 (1974).
64. A California court of appeal has rejected the argument that admission may be
compelled to a voluntary organization in any situation where membership may enhance
or affect one's professional or economic interest. Blatt v. University of Southern Califor-
nia, 5 Cal. App. 3d 935, 941-42, 85 Cal. Rptr. 601, 605 (1970).
65. The California Supreme Court first faced the issue of compelling admission to
voluntary organizations in James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329
(1944). In that case the court said that where a union has attained a monopoly supply of
labor it obtains a position analogous to that of a public service business. It may no longer
claim the same freedom from legal restraint enjoyed by golf clubs or fraternal associa-
tions. Id. at 731, 155 P.2d at 335. Arguably, the court would not call these business-
oriented clubs fraternal organizations. In any event, the court decided the case on a com-
mon law right to public services and the right to earn a living. This in no way would
prevent a private club from being deemed a "business establishment" under the Unruh
Act. In this case, the court discussed Civil Code §§ 51, 52, as they read prior to the
current Unruh Act. The statutes at that time related only to specifically enumerated
public accommodations such as inns and restaurants, and therefore the court did not base
its decision on the statutes. James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d at 740, 155 P.2d at
339-40.
CONCLUSION
The Unruh Act has for years affected more groups and entities
than any other civil rights statute. The O'Connor decision serves to
further this development. In O'Connor the California Supreme Court
applied and expanded the broad interpretation of "business estab-
lishment" under the Unruh Act to include a condominium owners
association.
This Comment, focusing on private clubs, contends that most of
these clubs have sufficient businesslike attributes to reasonably con-
stitute a "business establishment of every kind whatsoever." This
brings such clubs within the reach of the Unruh Act, and makes any
arbitrary discrimination practiced by them prohibited. Small clubs
that lack sufficient businesslike attributes to fall within the scope of
the Unruh Act's reference to "business establishments" should be
excluded from the Act's mandate.
BRADLEY D. SCHWARTZ
